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Most single adults share housing with other adults, and living alone is considerably more 
expensive than living with someone else.  Yet policies that discourage shared housing for 
formerly homeless people or people at risk of becoming homeless are common, and those 
that discourage it are rare. This would be understandable if such housing adversely 
affected its users in some way.  We ask whether shared housing produces adverse effects. 
Our provisional answer is no.  Indeed, shared housing is associated with reduced 
psychotic symptomology and it appears that this relationship is causal over some time 
frames, although the latter result is not robust.  We use data from ACCESS, a 5-year, 18-
site demonstration project with over 6,000 formerly homeless individuals as participants. 
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 Most single adults share housing with other adults, and living alone is 
considerably more expensive than living with someone else.  The 2005 American 
Community Survey found that of adults under 65 in the household population who were 
not living with spouses, only 23.8% lived alone.  The cost per person of maintaining the 
same standard of living is probably between 36% and 47% lower in a two-person 
household than in a one-person household (the former standard is based on federal 
poverty guidelines [Nelson, 1993] and the latter on an econometric study [Lazear and 
Michael, 1980]). Yet policies that encourage shared housing for formerly homeless 
people or people at risk of becoming homeless are rare.  Indeed, the section 8 housing 
voucher program, one of the most commonly used vehicles to prevent homelessness, 
implicitly discourages shared housing. 
 Neglecting shared housing, or even holding a negative attitude toward it, would 
be understandable if such housing adversely affected its users in some way: made them 
more likely to re-enter homelessness, or less well-adjusted to their communities, or 
noticeably less satisfied with their lives.  The goal of this paper is to begin to explore 
whether shared housing produces any of these deleterious effects.  Our provisional 
answer is no.   
 Our approach is nonexperimental.  We use the well-known ACCESS (Access to 
Community Care and Effective Services and Supports) data set.  ACCESS was a 5-year, 
18-site demonstration project that examined the effect of service integration among 
homeless people with severe mental illness.  It provides detailed longitudinal data for at 
least a year for over 6,000 participants.  Mares and Rosenheck (2004) also look at the 
effect of living arrangements on a number of outcomes for ACCESS participants, but 
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they use a different partition of arrangements. 
 Our interest is in shared housing, not group homes. 
 We first run OLS regressions to determine whether sharing housing is correlated 
with subsequent changes in mental health and other outcomes.  We find only one 
significant difference between living alone and sharing, and that significant difference 
indicates that sharing is better, not worse.  Sharing housing is associated with less 
psychotic symptomology.  On the other hand, sharing is also associated unconditionally 
with greater homelessness several months later, but this association is not significant.  
People who share housing are more likely to be homeless again in a few months, but the 
reason appears to be that they have less income or that they live in areas with tighter 
housing markets (or in ACCESS sites with less effective case managers). 
 OLS cannot shed much light on causality, however. It may be that whatever it is 
that causes sharing—good social support, for instance—is better for mental health than 
whatever it is that causes living alone—federal subsidies, for instance.  Therefore we use 
instrumental variables to check whether the result on psychosis is causal.  Our 
instrumental variables are the amounts of competitive federal funding for homelessness 
programs that states received in the years immediately preceding ACCESS, and the 
number of Section 8 vouchers the jurisdictions received in 1996 (all numbers normalized 
by the number of poor people).  The instrumental variables results indicate that the 
impact of shared housing on psychotic symptomology may be causal at 12 months, but 
not at 3 months.  The 12-month result, however, is not robust. 
 The plan of the paper is the following.  We begin by showing how our question 
and results are linked to policy questions about shared housing.  Our approach to shared 
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housing is somewhat unorthodox (although entirely orthodox within economics) and 
needs some explaining.  In an ideal world, our paper would be presenting a modest result 
within a huge literature, but unfortunately most of that huge literature has not been 
written yet.  The next section is a literature review.  Section 3 is about methods, and 
section 4 presents results. 
 
1.  Policy discussions 
 Our results are relevant to two areas of policy: programs specifically targeted to 
homeless people and people deemed to be at risk of homelessness; and broader design 
issues in many federal housing assistance, food, and income maintenance programs.  In 
both cases, our aim is to advance the policy discussion, not to resolve it completely.  
Since most programs targeted specifically at homeless people make generous use of the 
broader federal programs, design issues in those programs are directly relevant to 
homelessness programs, and so the dichotomy is less stark than it might appear.  It is 
more convenient to discuss the broader design issues first and at greater length because 
the design principles we are concerned with are more obvious in those programs. 
 
 A.  The implicit tax on shared housing 
 Many federal assistance programs impose a substantial implicit tax on shared 
housing.  Supplemental Security Income (SSI), for instance, reduces the payments an 
eligible person receives when she lives with an ineligible person.  The food stamp 
program has a series of complex thresholds and calculations that greatly penalize sharing.  
Ellen and O’Flaherty (2007) use the example of two poor individuals in New York City 
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in 1998; with plausible income and rent values, they would lose 74% of their combined 
food stamp benefits if they moved in together.   
 Section 8—the Housing Choice Voucher Program—also taxes sharing.  A 
household with a section 8 voucher pays 30% of its income in rent, and its landlord 
receives an administratively determined fair market rent (FMR).  The FMR for a 
household of two is far less than twice the FMR for a household of one.  (FMRs are 
based numbers of bedrooms and local surveys, and so no fixed percentages are available, 
but in New York the FMR for two has been as little as 10-20% greater than the FMR for 
one.)  Thus the rent subsidy an eligible individual would receive if she shared housing is 
much smaller than the subsidy she would receive if she lived alone. 
 The larger policy issue with these programs that we begin to address in this paper 
is whether this tax is justified or good public policy.  The case against such a tax is 
standard, orthodox, and obvious: it distorts decisions and creates deadweight loss.  The 
implicit tax rate on sharing is high and the empirical literature we survey below indicates 
that household size is responsive to implicit taxes; thus the deadweight loss this tax 
creates is likely to be considerable.  
 The case for this tax has never been explicitly articulated to our knowledge, and 
so is more difficult to piece together.  One classical argument for such a tax would be 
Pigouvian: sharing creates external costs in some way, and so people’s decisions to share 
housing should be discouraged and not fully respected.  The external costs could be 
physical: shared housing might be dirtier or noisier or disease might spread more quickly 
in shared housing.  Or the external costs might be fiscal: sharing might make people more 
likely to receive transfers or less likely to pay taxes.  Finally the “external costs” might be 
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associated with lack of self-control or judgment errors: people might decide to share 
housing by mistake or without realizing the objectively bad consequences it might have 
for them or because of urges they cannot always control.  One might describe this third 
concern as a paternalistic argument against sharing, rather than a Pigouvian one; we are 
indifferent about the terminology.  In any of these cases, a tax on sharing of some size 
(not necessarily so large as the taxes now in place) would be good public policy. 
 These arguments for a tax on sharing, though, require empirical support.  In this 
paper we examine empirically whether sharing has particular fiscal and paternalistic costs 
among a group of people among whom these costs are especially likely to be present. 
Thus we examine one particular possible justification for the tax on sharing.  It is in that 
sense that we are making a modest contribution to a literature that should be huge. 
 Many other empirical claims about why people would share housing too much in 
the absence of this tax could be made, obviously, and we review below some of the 
literature on this topic.  (Claims could also be made that sharing has external benefits—
for instance, that living alone is complementary to leisure, and so should be taxed if labor 
is taxed and leisure cannot be.)  Many additional papers can and should be written. 
 We also do not try to figure out how programs could be redesigned with a smaller 
tax on sharing or none at all.  In particular, we do not discuss whether it would be better 
to keep the current level of assistance for someone living alone and raise the level of 
assistance to people who share; or to keep the current level of assistance for people who 
share and drop the level for those who live alone; or to undertake a convex combination 
of these reforms.  These are important questions, but beyond the scope of this paper. 
 Notice that even if we find no justification for the tax on sharing, we are not 
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arguing that everyone should live in a big household.  Our argument is for less distorted 
consumer choice unless solid research demonstrates external or paternalistic costs to 
sharing.   
 Thus what we reject as an a priori proposition is that programs should be designed 
so that participants on average are roughly indifferent to the size of the household they 
live in.  Pendakur (1999, p. 2), for instance, writes:  “An accurate equivalence scale may 
allow decision makers to design transfer programs that do not create incentives for 
program participants to change their household type to increase their level of welfare.”  
This proposition implies that the tax on sharing should be confiscatory—all of the 
economies of scale from larger household size should inure to the benefit of the 
government.  It is little different from the proposition that taxes on labor should be 
confiscatory---“…transfer programs that do not create incentives for program participants 
to change their hours of work to increase their level of welfare.”   
 Of course, if sharing (or working) carries with it external or paternalistic costs that 
are very large, then the Pendakur proposition might be a good guide to policy—but that is 
an empirical question, not an a priori one. 
 
 B.  Application to homelessness 
 Since many programs to prevent and deal with homelessness are tied to SSI, food 
stamps, or section 8, the immediate application of these ideas is obvious.  There are also 
many other ways that an implicit tax on sharing manifests itself in programs for 
alleviating homelessness.  Partly it shows up in programs that do not place people in 
shared housing, and in homelessness prevention programs that do not give housing 
 7
assistance to people who are doubled up; the tax in this case is the full amount of 
program benefits.  The tax also shows up in how housing counselors steer their clients, 
and whether clients realize rewards, financial or otherwise, when they choose to share. 
 Again, redesigning the programs that deal with homelessness is beyond this 
paper’s scope. 
 
2.  Literature review 
 Five different strands of literature have some relevance to policy questions we are 
asking.  Several of these strands have more apparent than actual relevance.  We begin 
with the more relevant strands. 
 
 A.  Policy proposals to reduce the tax on sharing 
 Several writers have advanced proposals to reduce the tax on sharing by providing 
assistance to people who are doubled up and to their hosts.  Rossi (1989) proposed a 
program of “Aid to Families with Dependent Adults” to help defray the expenses that 
hosts incur.  Shinn et al. (1991) found that many host families made great efforts to keep 
doubled-up families from entering shelter, and sought programs to help the hosts in those 
efforts.  Vacha and Martin (1993) surveyed host families and echoed the 
recommendations of Shinn et al.  Wasson and Hill (1998) cited Vacha and Martin’s 
finding that the main problem for hosts was lack of space, particularly crowding of 
kitchens and bathrooms, and recommended that policies for doubled up families 
concentrate on lessening the tensions surrounding sharing an apartment—“restaurant 
vouchers, child care, conflict resolution assistance, mental therapy, and access to 
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bathroom and/or cooking facilities (p. 339).” 
 Another group of scholars has called for reform of zoning laws and building 
codes to remove legal impediments to shared housing.  See Ahrentzen (2003) and 
Ritzdorf (1994). 
 
 B.  External and paternalistic costs of shared housing 
 Since this paper is looking for external and paternalistic costs of shared housing, 
we review other papers that look for or find such costs. 
 The greatest number of such papers concentrate on medical costs, and examine 
the effects of crowded housing, not shared housing per se.  Children in crowded 
conditions are more susceptible to respiratory ailments (Mann et al. 1992),  stomach 
illnesses (Galpin et al. 1992, Mendall and Northfield 1995), and cerebro-spinal diseases 
(Pierce et al 1995).  Children brought up in crowded conditions die younger (Coggon et 
al. 1993).  There is also some evidence of greater morbidity among adults (Mann et al. 
1992, Mendall and Northfield 1995).   
 Crowding also affects development and concentration, especially in children and 
young adults.  See Shapiro (1974), Rodin (1976), Booth and Edwards (1976), Booth and 
Johnson (1975), Karlin et al. (1979), Nagar (1998) and Epstein (1981).  For a judicious 
review of literature on health and shared housing, see Ahrentzen (2003). 
 Empirically, crowding is correlated with household size, probably because when 
people’s income rises they purchase both less crowding and smaller households (just as 
people with nicer cars tend to own nicer refrigerators).  But conceptually, crowding and 
household size are distinct.  Crowding means a large number of people per cubic foot; 
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large household size means a large number of people per housing unit.  A larger 
household that lives in a larger housing unit is not more crowded.  Indeed it is easier to 
accommodate people without crowding if they live in larger households.  For instance, to 
house two individuals living alone in 1000-square-foot units with 8-foot high ceilings 
requires 6024 square feet of exterior wall, ceiling and floor.  To accommodate the same 
two individuals in a single housing unit, and give each the same 1000 square feet of space 
with an 8-foot ceiling requires only 5431 square feet of exterior wall, ceiling, and floor. 
Larger households reduce crowding more cheaply than smaller households. 
 Another group of papers identify shared housing—“doubling up”—as a risk factor 
for homelessness.  For instance: Weitzman et al.  (1990), Caton et al. (1994, 1995),  
Bassuk et al. (1997), Shinn et al. (1998), Caton et al. (2000), Lehmann et al. (2007).  
Sharing housing at one time is correlated with homelessness at a slightly later time.  This 
relationship is usually robust when many other independent variables are added, but these 
papers do not check for causality.  Persistent unobserved characteristics (small demand 
for privacy, for instance, or a tight housing market) could be contributing to both being 
doubled up and being homeless.  Most of these papers use samples drawn from some 
general population, and so any unobserved characteristics associated with both doubling 
up and homelessness will be relatively rare.  Our sample consists entirely of formerly 
homeless people, and so the unobserved characteristics should be much more prevalent.  
If persistent unobserved characteristics are responsible for the correlation between 
doubling up and homelessness, then we should expect a much weaker correlation in our 
sample than in the samples in which risk factors are normally studied. 
 Dworsky and Piliavin (2000) look at the probability of re-entering homelessness 
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for a sample of formerly homeless people.  In that regard, this paper is like ours.  They 
find that those who doubled  up as their first housing arrangement after homelessness 
were more likely than those who lived in a house to which they had legal title were more 
likely to re-enter homelessness, holding many other characteristics constant.  There are 
several important differences between their paper and ours.  Their sample is much 
smaller and geographically homogeneous, and their set of covariates is much less rich.  
Our sample is less heterogeneous in that all members are mentally ill as well as formerly 
homeless.  They also define housing arrangements differently, with more attention to 
legal distinctions than to physical ones.  Thus they apparently do not count people who 
share housing but are primary tenants as doubled up, and they even make a distinction 
between those who live in apartments and those who live alone in SROs.   
 None of these papers attempts to assess the cost of living alone, so that we could 
tell whether homelessness could be reduced more for the same expenditure if some 
people doubled up.   
 We would like to test for causality, but we have not been able to find instrumental 
variables that would let us do so.  We provide a rough cost-benefit calculation in the 
conclusion. 
 
 C.  Responsiveness 
 The policy implications of this paper are relevant only if moderate changes in 
policies can affect whether or not people share housing.  If everyone is inexorably fated 
either to share housing or not, then the tax on shared housing creates no distortions, and 
programs that make it easier to share housing will have no effect on homelessness (or 
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anything else). 
 But substantial evidence indicates that modest changes in policies and programs 
can trigger substantial changes in sharing because many people are on the margin 
between sharing and living alone.  Ellen and O’Flaherty (2007) survey many of these 
papers.  (Freeman 2005 is a partial exception to this general finding, but Ellen and 
O’Flaherty discuss the reasons at length.) 
 For instance, in a time-series analysis, Murray (1999) finds that public housing 
reduces household size so considerably that demand for private housing does not fall 
when more public housing is built.  He does not find similar responsiveness for subsidy 
programs targeted to somewhat better off households.  Sinai and Waldfogel (2005) look 
at cross-sectional data and test for causality; they find that project-based and tenant-based 
subsidies reduce household size, although by smaller amounts than Murray found.  Susin 
(2005) used propensity score matching to perform a longitudinal analysis of the effect of 
subsidy receipt.  Receiving federal housing subsidies reduced the number of adults in a 
household. 
 More recently, Abt Associates et al. (2006) report on a large controlled 
experiment in which randomly selected welfare families received section 8 vouchers.  
The vouchers reduced household size dramatically, and virtually eliminated households 
where the head lived with parents and siblings.  (The control mean household had 0.599 
adults other than the respondent, and treatment-on-the-treated effect was to reduce adults 
in the household by 0.766, which was highly significant.  See exhibit 3-10.) 
 None of these papers, however, focuses on formerly homeless people or mentally 
ill people. 
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  D. Expressed preferences 
 A number of papers report on responses of consumers to hypothetical questions 
about whether they would like to live alone or share housing, without specifying the 
consumption of other goods in those two situations.  In most cases, most consumers say 
they would prefer to live alone. For instance, interviews in Abt Associates et al. (2006) 
find voucher recipients happy to be able to set up households independent of their parents 
or to leave abusive relationships.  Tanzman (1993) surveys many papers that examine 
expressed preferences among mental health consumers.  
 These opinion questionnaires are not relevant to our question because respondents 
were not asked what they would be willing to give up in order to live alone.  Even if they 
had been asked this question, average willingness-to-pay is not a useful statistic.  What 
matters is the distribution of the willingness-to-pay in the neighborhood of the difference 
between the costs of living alone and the costs of sharing.  The responsiveness studies tell 
us this.   
 By way of analogy:  If asked whether they would prefer a job where they had to 
work 6 hours a day to the same job where they had to work 8 hours a day and received 
the same pay, most people would probably choose the 6-hour job.  But no one would 
refer to such “preferences” as an argument for confiscatory tax rates on earned income. 
 
 E.  Evolving consumer households 
 Caplan et al. (2006) compared formerly homeless mentally ill people living in 
group homes with those living in independent apartments.  Socially isolated housing was 
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associated with weakened executive functioning.  While this result suggests one way that 
sharing might help consumers, aside from saving resources, it is not a clean test of shared 
housing.  In the Caplan et al. study, people living in group homes also received more 
professional support, and so it is not possible to tell whether group living or professional 
support was responsible for the better executive functioning.  In general, the bundling of 
professional support and residential arrangements that occurs in group homes is the 
reason why this paper does not try to say anything about them. 
  
3.  Methods 
 A.  Data 
 ACCESS gathered data from nine randomly selected pairs of sites in nine states.  
In each pair, the experimental site received funds to promote integration of service 
systems and to support assertive community treatment for clients; the control site 
received funds only for assertive community treatment.  Each site was responsible for 
recruiting 100 clients per year in four annual cohorts.  The first cohort was recruited 
between May 1994 and July 1995; the fourth was recruited between May 1997 and July 
1998.   
 Clients were eligible if they were homeless, suffered from severe mental illness, 
and were not involved in ongoing community treatment.  Clients who agreed to 
participate in the program were evaluated with a comprehensive baseline interview and 
were re-interviewed three months later and twelve months later.   
 The client-level evaluation of ACCESS is described in greater detail in 
Rosenheck et al. (2002) and Randolph et al. (2002). 
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  B.  Variables 
 i.  Household arrangements 
 Our key independent variables are those that describe whether a person is living 
alone or sharing housing.  Unfortunately, ACCESS does not provide direct information 
about this.  Accordingly, we construct several variables to indicate whether individuals 
are certainly living alone or almost certainly sharing at the 3-month and 12-month 
follow-ups.  At each follow-up, we construct four dummy variables representing 
individuals who are:  a) definitely living alone (DLA), b) pretty definitely sharing a place 
to live (PDS), c) other-negative, and d) all else.  These categories are exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive.  Because our goal was to make the DLA and PDS categories include 
only people living alone or sharing, respectively, it is likely that the “all else” category 
contains some people who had been living alone or sharing for fairly long periods of 
time. 
 These categories are complex because several different questions contain 
information about household arrangements, and we want to assign someone to a category 
only if all information points in the same direction. 
 “Definitely living alone” at a follow-up point is defined by the following 
conditions, each of which was met: 
 1.  To the question about how many days the respondent had been living at 
various places in the last 60 days, “own place” was recorded at more than 30 days; and 
 2.  To the question about when the respondent last lived independently, the last 
date was the interview date, approximately, the habitation was described as “own place,” 
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and the number of other people living there was zero; and  
 3. To the questions about relationships, all the questions about whether someone 
lives with the respondent were answered no; and 
 4.  The interviewer considered the interview reliable. 
 
 “Pretty definitely sharing” meant that the following conditions were met: 
 1.  To the question about how many days the respondent had been living at 
various places in the last 60 days, “own place” and “someone else’s place” sum to 30 
days or more; and 
 2.  The interviewer considered the interview reliable; and  
 3.  Either: 
  (a) To the question about when the respondent last lived independently, 
the last day was the interview date, approximately, and the number of other people living 
there was greater than zero, and either the place was described as “own place” or 
“someone else’s place,” or 
  (b) To the questions about relationships, at least one of the questions about 
whether some lives with the respondent was answered yes, and condition 2 for DLA was 
not satisfied. 
 
 “Other-negative” meant that out of the previous 60 days, the respondent spent at 
least 31 days homeless, or at least 31 days institutionalized, or at least 45 days either 
institutionalized or homeless.  “Homeless” means sleeping outdoors (either urban or 
rural), in an abandoned building or public building, in an automobile, or in a shelter.  
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“Institutions” are halfway houses, residential treatment programs, hospitals, jails, and 
prisons. 
 “All else” is the residual category.  It includes people who gave inconsistent 
answers as well as people who lived several places in the months before the interview. 
 Table 1 shows the distribution of housing arrangements. 
 This table shows a marked increase over time in the number of respondents in 
conventional housing, but it also shows a great deal of instability.  About half of those 
who were either DLA or PDS at 3 months were no longer so at 12 months.  The large 
number in the “all-else” category may also indicate instability.  Notice also that most of 
the ACCESS participants who were able to achieve stable conventional housing were 
living in shared housing. 
 About three-quarters of participants who were sharing appeared to be sharing with 
other family members.  This was true at both 3-months and 12-months. 
 
 ii.  Dependent variables 
 Our dependent variables are several measures of well-being that have been 
previously used in ACCESS studies.  The first is a subjective quality-of-life indicator.  
This is a seven-point scale where higher values indicate greater satisfaction with quality-
of-life.  The second is a composite mental health score constructed from a series of 
questions about depression, psychosis, alcohol abuse, and substance abuse.  Lower values 
on this scale indicate better mental health.  
 In addition to these overall measures, we also look at depression, psychosis, 
alcohol abuse, and drug abuse separately.  For these disorders, we also use measures 
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previously developed and employed.  Smaller is better with these measures.  The 
depression score indicates the presence of symptoms of severe depression during the past 
month, and the psychosis score measures the frequency with which participants have 
experienced feelings or beliefs indicating symptoms of psychosis during the past month.  
Both scores omit experiences under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  The drug and 
alcohol abuse measures are scores on addiction severity indexes, each constructed from 
multiple items on the ACCESS questionnaires. 
 We also have a measure of social support; for this, higher values are better.  This 
measures the number of family members and friends who would lend the participant 
$100, give him a ride to an appointment, or provide emotional support. 
 Finally, we have three measures of safety.  The first is a self-report of the number 
of times the respondent has been a victim of crime in the past two months 
(“victimization”).  Obviously, smaller numbers are better here.  We have two subjective 
measures of safety: global personal safety (“safe1”) and safety where the respondent lives 
(“safe2”).  For both, larger numbers are better. 
 We also run regressions with the number of days homeless or institutionalized out 
of the previous sixty as dependent variables. 
 
 iii.  Other independent variables 
 We run regressions with two sets of controls.  The short set includes gender, race, 
ethnicity (Hispanic or not), and age.  The long set contains the short set plus English-
speaking ability, years in the city, veteran status, whether the respondent’s checks go to a 
payee, years of education, an indicator of instability in the participant’s family of origin, 
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a measure of history of conduct disorder before the age of 15, the natural log of income 
the past month, the interview observations of psychotic behavior at intake (intob), 
whether the respondent is now married or was ever married, and whether the respondent 
has a child or a child present.  These variables are all measured at baseline.  For 12-
month outcomes, we also include the natural log of income at 3 months.  We use the 
short set as well as the long set because the short set allows us to use many more 
observations. 
 For some of the regressions where homelessness is the dependent variable, we use 
indicators of whether the individual previously had a section 8 voucher or was a resident 
of public housing as control variables.  
 For all regressions reported in this paper (except the instrumental variable 
estimates), we include year and site controls.  Since ACCESS was designed to use 
different sites to test different approaches helping formerly homeless people, omitting 
these controls would lose an important source of variation.  Housing markets, too, are 
likely to be different in the different sites. 
 iv.  Instrumental variables 
 Our instrumental variables are the amounts of discretionary Continuum of Care 
funds that states received from the federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) in fiscal years 1993, 1994, and 1995; and the number of section 8 
vouchers in the relevant city or county in 1996.  The former data are available in 
Barnard-Columbia Center for Urban Policy (1996, table A-2); the latter are available 
from the Picture of Subsidized Housing in HUDUSER.  We normalize by dividing by the 
simple average of 1990 and 2000 poor populations, and take the natural logarithms of the 
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resulting ratios.   (Poor population in 1990 and poor population in 2000 are strongly 
correlated, with R2 above .99 on both city and state levels.)  We have also normalized by 
dividing by population; the results are similar and we do not report them. 
 For the first set of instrumental variables, HUD made competitive grants under 
several different categorical programs in these years in attempting to implement the 
Continuum of Care for homeless persons.  The programs involved were Supportive 
Housing (the largest source of funds), Shelter Plus Care, Section 8 SRO, and Innovative 
programs (a small amount).  Since the majority of these funds were targeted at 
encouraging formerly homeless people to live alone, we would expect more funding to 
increase the proportion of people living alone.  We expect the funds to be spent for 
several years after they were awarded.  We do not expect these funds to affect directly the 
mental health of ACCESS participants; that is our exclusion restriction. 
 As discussed in the policy section and shown in the literature review, section 8 
vouchers reduce the relative price of living alone and encourage smaller households, 
among those who receive them.  To the extent that the availability of section 8 vouchers 
leads to more ACCESS participants securing these vouchers, ACCESS participants 
would be less likely to share housing (and less likely to be homeless or experience other 
bad outcomes).  On the other hand, Susin (2002) has argued that section 8 vouchers 
increase the rents that non-recipient poor people pay and provided some empirical 
support for this position.  If this position is correct, and most ACCESS participants do not 
receive section 8 vouchers, then more section 8 vouchers should raise rents that most 
ACCESS participants face, and increase the proportion who share housing (and the 
proportion who are homeless or experience other bad outcomes). 
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 Since our instrumental variables are site-specific, we cannot use site dummies in 
these equations.  Hence we use a dummy for those participants in treatment sites in these 
equations. 
 
 C.  Estimating strategy 
 Our ideal empirical strategy would be to regress outcomes on a weighted sum of 
past days sharing or living alone, probably with greater weight on more recent days.  We 
do not have the information to carry out this ideal strategy.  Our DLA and PDS variables 
are proxies for these ideal variables: they indicate membership in groups that are highly 
likely to be living alone or sharing at the time of observation, and that had a considerable 
amount of time in that status in the recent past. Differences in the coefficients on these 
variables indicate that sharing affected respondents differently from living alone. 
 Since our DLA and PDS variables are noisy measures, the coefficients on these 
variables may suffer from attenuation bias.  That is, because our variables do not measure 
living alone and sharing perfectly, the coefficients on these variables will be biased 
toward zero, everything else being equal. 
 i.  Estimation at 3 months 
 At the 3-month follow-up, this strategy is straightforward.  We regress outcomes 
on household arrangements, baseline values of the outcome, and four different sets of 
controls.  Thus at 3-months our basic equation is: 
Outcome at 3-months= α + β∗outcome at baseline + γ* housing arrangement at 3 months 
+δ∗controls + ε. 
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For controls, we use either the long or short series. Except for year dummies, all controls 
are measured at baseline.  In all these equations, DLA is the omitted category. Thus the 
coefficient for sharing is the difference between the effect of sharing and the effect of 
living alone.   
 ii.  Estimation at 12-months 
 At 12-months, we look only at 3-month household arrangements as an 
explanatory variable.  Thus our OLS estimating equations are: 
Outcome at 12-months= α + β∗outcome at 3-months + γ* housing arrangement at 3 
months +δ∗controls + ε. 
All controls (except year dummies) are measured at baseline.  Thus all right-hand side 
variables are measured before 12-months (except year dummies, again). 
 This specification considerably reduces the problems of endogeneity. We are 
asking how 3-month housing arrangements affect 12-month outcomes, holding 3-month 
outcomes constant.  If, for instance, better contemporaneous social support leads to more 
contemporaneous shared housing, and that is the only relationship between social support 
and sharing, then sharing will show no effect on social support in the estimating equation.  
Better social support at 12-months, the dependent variable, will be correlated with 
sharing at 12-months, but sharing at 12-months is not an explanatory variable.  If social 
support at 12-months is correlated with social support at 3-months, then sharing at 3-
months will be correlated with social support at 12-months through social support at 3-
months—but our equation controls for social support at 3-months.  Thus this estimating 
equation avoids the obvious endogeneity problems. 
 (We cannot use this specification at 3-months because everyone is homeless at 
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baseline.) 
 iii. Instrumental variables estimation 
 Because our OLS results cannot rule out all forms of reverse causality, we use 
instrumental variables where possible to see which relationships are likely to be causal. 
 At 3-months, the problems of endogeneity with OLS are obvious, since we are 
measuring the effects of contemporaneous housing arrangements on contemporaneous 
outcomes.  (For some outcomes, like personal safety, endogeneity may be less of a 
concern than for others, like social support.) 
 At 12-months, as we have noted, using only lagged housing arrangements reduces 
considerably the endogeneity problem.  Still, subtle kinds of endogeneity could arise.  For 
instance, if individuals or their families or their caregivers can forecast reductions in 
psychotic symptomology nine months in advance (beyond standard mean reversion), then 
families may welcome individuals at 3-months in anticipation of improvement.  If 
forecasts are more accurate than random guesses around mean reversion, then reductions 
psychotic symptomology will be correlated with sharing. 
 We also want to use instrumental variables at 12-months to find out whether 
contemporaneous housing arrangements are having any deleterious effects.   
 Our first-stage equations are multinomial logit regressions for the odds of each 
household arrangement, relative to DLA, at 3-months and at 12-months.   The 
asymptotic properties of IV estimators apply only when the first-stage is somewhat 
stronger than ours.  Accordingly, we will use IV estimates only to look at results where 
OLS was significant; we will not check whether coefficients that were insignificant in 
OLS become significant.   
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 At 3-months, our first-stage equation will be the same as the OLS regression, 
except that we use the estimated probabilities of each household arrangement at 3 months 
as our independent variables instead of dummy variables.  Thus we estimate the effect of 
current household arrangements on current outcomes. 
 At 12 months, we run two kinds of regressions.  First, we repeat our OLS 
specification for 12 months, where we include 3-month but not 12-month housing 
arrangements, but with 3-month housing arrangements estimated.  Then we include both 
3-month and 12-month housing arrangements, with only 12-month housing arrangements 
estimated:  
Outcome at 12-months= α + β∗outcome at 3-months + γ*  actual housing arrangement at 
3 months +  +δ∗estimated probabilities of housing arrangements at 12 months + 
φ∗controls + ε. 




4.  Results 
 A.  Baseline conditions 
 At intake, those who go on to share housing do not appear to be significantly 
different in any observable dimension from those who go on to live alone.  Table 2 
summarizes the data. 
 Table 2 shows that on most variables people who will live alone have somewhat 
better observable baseline characteristics than those who will share housing, but the 
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differences are small and always far from significant.  The one exception is social 
support: those who will share housing score higher on this variable than those who will 
live alone.  The difference is still not significant at conventional levels.  This result is not 
surprising, since social support makes it easier for people to find others with whom to 
share housing. 
 Although participants who would be living alone at 12 months had lower income 
at baseline than participants who would be sharing at 12 months, the relationship was 
reversed for income recorded at 12 months.  At 12-months, moreover, participants living 
alone had higher current income than participants sharing. 
 
 B.  OLS results at 3 months 
 At 3 months, household arrangements appear to make no difference to outcomes.  
Table 3 shows the result.  For each outcome, this table shows the coefficient on sharing.   
 The outstanding feature of Table 3 is that nothing is significant.  There is no 
support in this table for the hypothesis that sharing housing has adverse effects—indeed, 
most of the insignificant effects are weakly positive.  The table suggests that sharing is 
associated with more personal safety and social support, higher quality of life, and less 
psychotic symptomology.  We have also run these regressions without year and site 
dummies; in no case is sharing significantly associated with worse outcomes. 
 
 C.   OLS results at 12-months 
 Table 4 presents the results for the 12-month follow-up.  The lagged value of the 
dependent variable is the value at 3-months. 
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 As with the 3-month follow-up results, no significant coefficient indicates that 
living alone is associated with better outcomes than sharing, and only for quality of life, 
victimization, and drug abuse do small, insignificant coefficients suggest that living alone 
might be better than sharing.  In contrast with 3-months, however, sharing is significantly 
better than living alone for psychosis, when the long set of controls is used.  Since the 12-
month follow-up includes more people in conventional housing, and because it often 
reflects more experience with either living alone or sharing, it should not be surprising 
that the effects are larger and easier to discern. 
 Why is the effect of sharing on psychosis significant when the long set of controls 
is used, and insignificant when the short set is used?  The variables in the long set of 
controls but not in the short that are significant in the psychosis equation are English-
speaking ability, education, and a dummy for having a representative payee.  Holding 3-
month psychotic symptomology score constant, those with poor English-speaking ability, 
low education, and a representative payee have a higher expected psychosis score.  
Controlling for these variables makes the effect of sharing housing significant. 
  
 D. 12-month outcomes:  homelessness and institutionalization 
 At 12-months, we can also look at the effect of previous spells of sharing and 
living alone on homelessness and institutionalization.  (No one is sharing or living alone 
at baseline, and PDS and DLA by construction preclude contemporaneous homelessness, 
and so the effect at 12-months of housing arrangements at 3-months is the only one we 
can measure.)  Thus our dependent variables are the number of days homeless in the 
previous 60 days at the 12-month follow-up, and the number of days institutionalized.  
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Our explanatory variables are household arrangements at 3 months, and the usual sets of 
controls.   
 Also included as controls in some specifications are the number of days homeless 
and institutionalized in the 60 days preceding the 3-month follow-up—essentially the 
lagged value of the dependent variable.  We do not include these in all specifications 
because they are collinear with some of the household arrangement variables, especially 
bad-other.  For future reference, we want to see how the bad-other outcome at 3-months 
affects homelessness and institutionalization at 12-months. 
 Table 5 presents the results.  The first column indicates whether or not controls 
for days institutionalized at 3 months (I3) and days homeless at 3 months (H3) were 
included.  Sharing at 3-months appears to be associated with more homelessness and 
more days in institutions at 12-months, but the association is not significant.  Point 
estimates suggest that shared housing at 3 months is associated with 1.5  days more 
homelessness in the 60 days between month 10 and month 12, and about 1.0-1.2 more 
days of residence in institutional settings.  The mean number of days homeless at 12-
months is 10.0 with a standard deviation of 20.4; and the mean number of days in 
institutions is 8.6 with a standard deviation of 18.9.  Thus the point estimates in both 
cases are less than a tenth of a standard deviation.   
 The regression results are roughly congruent with the unconditional differences in 
mean days homeless and institutionalized.  Participants who were sharing at 3-months 
had on average 5.4 days homeless and 5.0 days in institutions at the 12-month follow-up; 
those who were living alone had 4.0 days homeless and 3.7 days in institutions. 
 In contrast to the results for sharing, participants with “bad-other” housing 
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arrangements at 3-months had many more days of homelessness and of institutional 
residence.  This is most clear when the lagged dependent variables are omitted from the 
specification, since these are positively correlated with this housing arrangement.  
 Part of the reason for the association, albeit insignificant, between sharing and 
homelessness, is that those who live alone are more likely to receive housing subsidies.  
When we control for receipt of section 8 vouchers and living in public housing at 3 
months, the coefficients on sharing fall by about a quarter in all specifications of the 
homelessness equation.  (The coefficients on sharing in the institutionalization equations 
fall by a somewhat smaller fraction.)   
 Having a section 8 voucher at 3 months has a large and significant negative 
impact on the number of days homeless at 12 months (it also reduces institutionalization, 
but not significantly).  The coefficient is about three times as large in absolute value as 
the coefficient on sharing in the homelessness equations.   
 It would be useful to look further into the effects of sharing on homelessness 
using an IV strategy, but we do not have a good instrumental variable for doing so.  The 




 E.  Instrumental variables results 
 First stage results.  Our first-stage equations are multinomial logit regressions for 
the odds of each household arrangement, relative to DLA, at 3-months and at 12-months.  
These are presented in the appendix.  Our greatest interest is in the equations for the PDS 
 2
household arrangement.  The coefficients on fiscal year 1993 funding level is negative 
and significant, while the coefficient on the other years’ funding levels is sometimes 
positive, sometimes insignificant and always smaller in absolute value—people in states 
with more funding are less likely to share housing, relative to living alone.  The effect is 
weaker in the 12-month equations, but since 3-month household arrangements are 
included as controls in these equations, the weaker effect of funding should not be 
surprising.  Vouchers appear to decrease rather than increase the propensity of people to 
live alone:  the coefficients on vouchers in the equations for all three other household 
arrangements are positive.   
 When we run regressions without vouchers, all three funding levels decrease 
sharing, and when we run regressions without funding levels, the effect of vouchers is 
often negative.  Similarly, when we drop one or more of the funding level variables, the 
remaining variables become more negative.  Thus with vouchers the market effect seems 
slightly stronger with this group than the direct subsidy effect, and because vouchers are 
positively correlated with funding levels, the market effect predominates when funding 
levels are held constant. 
 Second-stage results. At 3-months, sharing has no significant effect on psychosis; 
indeed the point estimate is positive.  Interestingly, though, sharing significantly reduces 
depression in the 3-month IV equation.  But since the OLS result on depression was not 
significant, this conclusion does not seem to be robust.  Most importantly, there is no IV 
evidence (or OLS evidence) that sharing adversely affects participants. 
 Second-stage instrumental variable results for psychosis at 12 months are shown 
in Table 6.  At 12-months, we begin with the same specification we used with OLS.  
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Because household arrangements are lagged nine months and 3-month outcomes are 
included as controls, the only reverse causality fear is that families and friends use 
information unobserved at baseline to anticipate improvements, and select the ACCESS 
participants more likely to improve to share housing with.  When we instrument for 3-
month household arrangements, we answer this objection.  The coefficient on sharing in 
the psychosis equation remains negative and significant, and in fact becomes larger:  -
16.287 (2.02) with the long series of controls and no year or site dummies.  However, 
when we include 3-month income as a control, the coefficient slips below significance 
(results not shown). 
 With instrumental variables, we can also enter household arrangements at 12-
months as an explanatory variable, provided we instrument for them, along with 3-
months housing arrangements.  With this specification and the long set of controls, both 
sharing at 3 months and sharing at 12 months have negative and insignificant 
coefficients.  With the short set of controls, sharing at 3 months has a positive and 
significant effect on psychosis, while sharing at 12 months has a negative and significant 
effect, much larger in absolute value. 
 Because sharing at 3 months is positively correlated with sharing at 12 months, 
we looked at the sum of coefficients on PDS-3 and PDS-12—what happens to a person 
who shares at both follow-ups.  The point estimate is negative for both sets of controls, 
but is significant only with the short set. 
 Our results thus suggest that the effect of sharing on psychosis is causal, but they 
are not robust. 
 Sharing had no significant effects on other outcomes.  (We also tested for whether 
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the sum of the coefficients on sharing at 3 months and sharing at 12 months was equal to 
zero, and we could not reject it for any outcome except psychosis.)  We also ran these 
regressions omitting various funding levels from the first-stage regression, and there were 
no major differences.  Similarly we ran these regressions normalizing funding levels and 




 Shared housing does not appear to affect its users adversely in most of the 
dimensions we examined.  On the contrary, in some dimensions it appears to help.  
Sharing at 3 months is associated with less psychotic symptomology at 12 months, and 
some of our results suggest that this relationship is causal, although this conclusion is not 
robust.  The idea that sharing reduces psychotic symptomology has intuitive appeal.  
Isolation leads people to dwell on their own internal thinking, while having contact with 
others fosters a focus on the interpersonal socialized world. 
 For the most part, whether a person lives alone or shares housing seems to make 
no difference to the outcomes we studied.  Of course, because we could not measure 
perfectly whether someone was living alone or sharing, our results may be biased toward 
a finding of “no difference.”  But most of our insignificant results indicated that sharing 
was associated with better outcomes than living alone, not the opposite.  Attenuation bias 
may be keeping us from concluding that sharing helps. 
 Even a finding of no difference on these dimensions, moreover, is support for a 
policy that does not tax sharing, because the tax on sharing dissuades some people from 
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living in ways that allows more resources to be devoted to other uses.  Since deadweight 
loss is a bad thing, only positive findings of external and paternalistic costs justify the tax 
on sharing. 
 The cost advantages of sharing are apparent even with the result most adverse to 
sharing—that sharing at 3-months raises days homeless (although insignificantly) at 12-
months.  Use the first line in table 5 to be precise. In this equation, sharing rather than 
living alone increased days homeless by about 1.5. The same equations indicated that 
bad-other status at 3-months increased days homeless at 12-months by 7.5 days, a result 
that was highly significant.   
 Consider a back-of-the-envelope calculation.  Suppose that sharing uses one-third 
less resources per person than living alone; this is in the upper range of the empirical 
findings.  Shift one person from living alone to sharing.  This frees up one-third of the 
resources needed for a person to live alone, which is one-half of the resources needed for 
a person to share.  Take these resources and use them to move a half-person from bad-
other to sharing.   
 Moving the person from living alone to sharing increases expected days homeless 
by 1.5 (even though the coefficient is insignificant).  On the other hand, moving a half 
person from bad-other to sharing reduces days homeless by  
 .5 (7.5 – 1.5) = 3.0. 
The net effect is a decrease of 1.5 in expected days homeless.  This calculation is 
conservative, but it is also crude, and meant only as a rough illustration. 
 Of course, “moving people” is only an expression we are using a metaphor, not as 
a policy recommendation.  The policies we are considering are reductions in the tax on 
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sharing—ceasing to try to dissuade people who want to share and reap the financial 
rewards of doing so.  The literature review indicates that such policies will almost 
certainly increase the number who share. 
 The primary non-obvious weakness of this paper is that we have no information 
about how sharing housing affected the people with whom ACCESS participants lived.  
But since those people consented to the sharing voluntarily, even if they later regretted 
doing so, there is no reason to think they suffered huge losses that were not somehow 
compensated. 
 This is important because household size is an extremely powerful variable.  The 
American Community Survey reported an average household size of 2.60 persons in 
2005, with a 90% confidence interval from 2.59 to 2.61.  With 111 million households in 
the United States, an increase in average household size smaller than .01—smaller than 
the American Community Survey could detect—would be sufficient to eliminate 
homelessness.  That is why thinking about the tax on sharing is important. 
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Table 1 Housing Arrangements of ACCESS Respondents 
 
 At 3 months At 12 months At 3 and 12 months 
Definitely living alone 423 1268 200 
Pretty definitely sharing 881 1513 480 
Other-negative 2829 1652  
All-else 2024 1341  






Table 2: Baseline Characteristics of Respondents 
By Subsequent Household Arrangements 
A.  Baseline characteristics by household arrangement at 3-months 
Baseline DLA PDS Other-bad All else 
Interview obs. of psychotic 
behavior 
9.37 8.68 11.40 10.70 
 (7.04) (7.01) (6.52) (7.61) 
Quality of life 3.28 3.12 3.18 3.34 
 (1.69) (1.71) (1.67) (1.76) 
Mental health score -.054 .126 -.009 .014 
 (.77) (.75) (.83) (.81) 
Depression 3.15 3.48 3.15 3.20 
 (1.95) (1.84) (2.00) (1.95) 
Alcohol abuse .112 .128 .146 .140 
 (.182) (.201) (.216) (.207) 
Drug abuse .048 .067 .072 .064 
 (.09) (.11) (.12) (.11) 
Psychosis 9.84 11.20 11.37 11.34 
 (9.15) (9.09) (9.36) (9.29) 
Personal safety 4.09 4.01 4.01 4.09 
 (1.62) (1.62) (1.66) (1.65) 
Safety where you live 4.24 4.23 4.06 4.15 
 (1.72) (1.74) (1.76) (1.78) 
Victimization .72 .77 .75 .79 
 (1.04) (1.11) (1.12) (1.14) 
Social support 1.89 2.42 1.63 1.87 
 (1.97) (2.34) (2.03) (2.18) 
Ln(income + 1) 4.64 4.55 4.31 4.48 
 (2.44) (2.38) (2.46) (2.42) 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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B.  Baseline characteristics by household arrangements at 12-months 
Baseline DLA PDS Other-bad All else 
Interview obs. of psychotic 
behavior 
9.85 9.00 11.96 11.68 
 (7.46) (7.19) (8.60) (8.12) 
Quality of life 3.18 3.08 3.30 3.46 
 (1.73) (1.68) (1.73) (1.73) 
Mental health score .000 .116 -.005 -.113 
 (.79) (.75) (.85) (.85) 
Depression 3.25 3.50 3.09 2.86 
 (1.94) (1.83) (2.02) (2.04) 
Alcohol abuse .126 .136 .167 .124 
 (.196) (.209) (.232) (.189) 
Drug abuse .052 .072 .079 .062 
 (.10) (.12) (.12) (.11) 
Psychosis 10.58 11.10 11.77 11.13 
 (9.13) (9.12) (9.46) (9.37) 
Personal safety 4.11 4.02 4.01 4.02 
 (1.58) (1.61) (1.72) (1.68) 
Safety where you live 4.18 4.13 3.99 4.23 
 (1.73) (1.76) (1.79) (1.76) 
Victimization .70 .80 .83 .73 
 (1.05) (1.16) (1.18) (1.07) 
Social support 1.86 2.18 1.62 1.80 
 (2.05) (2.26) (2.04) (2.29) 
Ln(income + 1) 4.44 4.57 4.40 4.38 
 (2.44) (2.34) (2.43) (2.47) 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 3:  Effect of Shared Housing on Various Outcomes, 
3-Month Follow-up with Year and Site Dummies 
Outcome: Quality of life (higher is better) 






Outcome: Mental health score (lower is better) 






Outcome: Depression (lower is better) 







Outcome: Alcohol abuse (lower is better) 







Outcome: Drug abuse (lower is better) 







Outcome: Psychosis (lower is better)        






Outcome: Social support (higher is better) 





     
Outcome: Victimization (lower is better)   





   
Outcome: Personal safety (higher is better) 






    
 
Outcome: Safety where you live (higher is better)    





Absolute t-values in parentheses.  * denotes significant at 10% level. 
N varies between 5749 and 6151 with the short set of controls; between 2481 and 2613 with the long 
set of controls. 
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Table 4:  Effect of Shared Housing on Various Outcomes, 12-Month Follow-up with 
Year and Site Dummies 
 Quality of life (higher is better) Mental health score (lower is better) 
Controls Coefficient on PDS-3 Coefficient on PDS-3 
Long -0.088 -0.060 
 (0.55) (0.79) 
Short -0.011 0.004 
 (0.11) (0.08) 
 
 Depression (lower is better) Alcohol abuse (lower is better) 
Controls Coefficient on PDS-3 Coefficient on PDS-3 
Long -0.068 -0.008 
 (0.34) (0.51) 
Short -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.05) (0.80) 
 
 Drug abuse (lower is better) Psychosis (lower is better) 
Controls Coefficient on PDS-3 Coefficient on PDS-3 
Long 0.003 -1.422* 
 (0.30) (2.08) 
Short 0.005 -0.230 
 (0.94) (0.52) 
 
 Social support (higher is better) Victimization (lower is better) 
Controls Coefficient on PDS-3 Coefficient on PDS-3 
Long 0.050 0.025 
 (0.22) (0.31) 
Short 0.093 0.034 
 (0.71) (0.67) 
    
 4
 Personal safety (higher is 
better) 
Safety where you live (higher is 
better) 
Controls Coefficient on PDS-3 Coefficient on PDS-3 
Long 0.096 0.040 
 (0.66) (0.25) 
Short 0.052 0.002 
 (0.57) (0.02) 
Absolute t-values in parentheses.  * denotes significant at 10% level.   N varies between 2123 and 
2247 for long set of controls; between 4993 and 5330 for short set of controls.  Long set of controls 
includes 3-month income.    
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Table 5a:  Effects of 3-month housing arrangements on 12-month homelessness 
And institutionalization 
All results with year and site dummies 
Outcome: Days homeless in the previous 60 days 
Including I3, H3 Controls Coefficient on PDS-3 On bad-other-3 
No Long 1.522 7.481** 
  (0.85) (4.44) 
Yes Long 1.533 2.188 
  (0.86) (0.86) 
No Short 1.961 8.651*** 
  (1.58) (7.88) 
Yes Short 2.103 1.199 
  (1.71) (0.67) 
     
Outcome: Days institutionalized in the previous 60 days 
Including I3, H3 Controls Coefficient on PDS-3 On bad-other-3 
No Long 1.136 5.879** 
  (0.63) (3.44) 
Yes Long 1.032 3.529 
  (0.58) (1.38) 
No Short 1.045 6.973*** 
  (0.89) (6.70) 
Yes Short 0.937 1.889 
  (0.82) (1.13) 
* Denotes significant at 10% level.  **Denotes significant at 5% level.  ***Denotes significant at 1% 
level.   N= 2247 for long set of controls; 5330 for short set of controls.  Long set of controls includes 
3-month income. 
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Table 5b:  Effects of 3-month housing arrangements on 12-month homelessness 
And institutionalization 
All results with year and site dummies and  
Controls for subsidized housing at 3 months 
“Subsidized housing” means section 8 or public housing 
Outcome: Days homeless in the previous 60 days 
Including I3, H3 Controls Coefficient on PDS-3 On bad-other-3 
No Long 1.167 6.871** 
  (0.65) (4.05) 
Yes Long 1.153 1.603 
  (0.65) (0.63) 
No Short 1.516 7.943*** 
  (1.22) (7.17) 
Yes Short 1.646 0.647 
  (1.33) (0.36) 
     
Outcome: Days institutionalized in the previous 60 days 
Including I3, H3 Controls Coefficient on PDS-3 On bad-other-3 
No Long 0.794 4.648** 
  (0.46) (2.82) 
Yes Long 0.771 2.598 
  (0.45) (1.06) 
No Short 0.876 6.495*** 
  (0.74) (6.19) 
Yes Short 0.841 1.741 
  (0.73) (1.04) 
* Denotes significant at 10% level.  **Denotes significant at 5% level.  ***Denotes significant at 1% 
level.   N= 2247 for long set of controls; 5330 for short set of controls.  Long set of controls includes  
3-month income. 
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Table 6:  Effect of Shared Housing on Psychotic Symptomology  
12-month follow-up with Treatment Site Dummy 
Instrumental Variable Results 
 
 
A. With long set of controls 
 No 12-month housing 
arrangement 
With 12-month housing 
arrangement 
Coeff of PDS-3 -16.287* -0.879 
 (2.02) (0.54) 
Coeff of PDS-12   na -1.999 




 na p=.335 
 
 
B.  With short set of controls 
 No 12-month housing 
arrangement 
With 12-month housing 
arrangement 
Coeff of PDS-3 -2.534  3.141* 
 (0.46) (2.39) 
Coeff of PDS-12   na -8.295** 




 na p=.046 
 
*Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.  N= 2248 for long set of controls; 
5322 for short set of controls.  P-value for sum of coefficients is for the null-hypothesis 
that the sum of coefficients is zero.  3-month income not included in long set of controls. 
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Appendix 1: First-Stage of IV Regression 
3-Months Living Arrangement 
Multinomial Logit Regression with Short Set of Controls 
Omitted Group = DLA (Definitely Living Along)  
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2  
 PDS Other-
bad 
All else PDS Other-bad All else 
Treatment Site Dummies 0.149 0.202 -0.116 na na na 
 (1.16) (1.82) (1.02)    
Baseline psychosis 0.016 0.016 0.021 0.017 0.018 0.020 
 (2.36)* (2.68)** (3.31)** (2.48)* (2.88)** (3.24)** 
vouchers 1.002 0.183 -0.565 0.914 0.098 -0.549 
 (4.56)** (0.94) (2.85)** (4.42)** (0.53) (2.90)** 
f1993 -0.777 -0.844 -0.436 -0.746 -0.805 -0.451 
 (5.17)** (6.08)** (3.04)** (5.09)** (5.97)** (3.24)** 
f1994 0.226 0.374 0.067 0.209 0.355 0.070 
 (1.29) (2.40)* (0.42) (1.20) (2.29)* (0.44) 
f1995 0.102 0.584 0.528 0.106 0.581 0.538 
 (1.25) (7.96)** (7.08)** (1.30) (7.91)** (7.19)** 
male -0.805 0.297 -0.032 -0.808 0.293 -0.029 
 (6.53)** (2.71)** (0.29) (6.55)** (2.68)** (0.26) 
black 0.075 0.073 -0.088 0.075 0.071 -0.091 
 (0.58) (0.64) (0.76) (0.57) (0.62) (0.78) 
hispanic -0.080 -0.266 -0.365 -0.083 -0.268 -0.365 
 (0.29) (1.10) (1.47) (0.30) (1.11) (1.47) 
age -0.043 -0.002 -0.013 -0.043 -0.002 -0.012 
 (6.68) (0.31) (2.21)* (6.71)** (0.36) (2.17)* 
Constant -0.007 0.469 3.597 0.339 0.836 3.484 
 (0.01) (0.66) (4.94)** (0.44) (1.25) (5.06)** 
Observations 6145 6145  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The table reports Multinomial (polytomous) logistic regression results. The coefficients should be 
interpreted as the effect of a variable on one housing arrangement (PDS, other-bad or all else) relative 
to the reference group, DLA.  
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Appendix 2: First-Stage of IV Regression 
3-Months Living Arrangement 
Multinomial Logit Regression with Long Set of Controls 
Omitted Group = DLA (Definitely Living Along)  
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2  
 PDS Other-bad All else PDS Other-bad All else 
Treatment Site Dummies 0.004 0.268 -0.178 na na na 
 (0.02) (1.42) (0.92)    
Baseline psychosis 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.008 
 (0.55) (0.63) (0.85) (0.55) (0.74) (0.77) 
voucher 1.085 0.373 -0.146 1.090 0.261 -0.080 
 (3.10)** (1.14) (0.44) (3.32)** (0.84) (0.25) 
f1993 -0.658 -0.846 -0.491 -0.654 -0.803 -0.522 
 (2.77)** (3.74)** (2.12)* (2.82)** (3.63)** (2.32)** 
f1994 0.384 0.469 0.464 0.380 0.448 0.478 
 (1.36) (1.77) (1.71) (1.35) (1.69) (1.77) 
f1995 0.027 0.544 0.278 0.027 0.543 0.283 
 (0.21) (4.46)** (2.30)* (0.21) (4.46)** (2.33)** 
male -0.213 0.466 0.304 -0.211 0.470 0.303 
 (0.94) (2.21)* (1.42) (0.93) (2.23)** (1.42) 
black 0.241 0.200 0.111 0.240 0.201 0.110 
 (1.11) (0.98) (0.54) (1.10) (0.99) (0.53) 
hispanic -0.377 -0.361 -0.303 -0.383 -0.384 -0.292 
 (0.74) (0.76) (0.63) (0.75) (0.81) (0.61) 
age -0.067 -0.038 -0.052 -0.067 -0.038 -0.052 
 (4.57)** (2.77)** (3.79)** (4.56)** (2.81)** (3.76)** 
english -0.320 -0.241 -0.375 -0.324 -0.282 -0.348 
 (0.66) (0.53) (0.82) (0.67) (0.62) (0.76) 
yearcity 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 
 (2.39)* (2.63)** (2.56)** (2.40)** (2.75)** (2.49)** 
veteran -0.287 -0.005 -0.268 -0.284 0.004 -0.277 
 (1.04) (0.02) (1.06) (1.03) (0.02) (1.10) 
payee -0.118 0.021 0.127 -0.118 0.002 0.140 
 (0.36) (0.07) (0.42) (0.36) (0.01) (0.46) 
edu -0.004 -0.041 -0.005 -0.004 -0.042 -0.003 
 (0.10) (1.03) (0.12) (0.10) (1.08) (0.09) 
finstab -0.020 -0.031 0.010 -0.020 -0.030 0.010 
 (0.46) (0.76) (0.25) (0.46) (0.73) (0.23) 
sociop 0.017 0.031 -0.008 0.017 0.030 -0.007 
 (0.35) (0.68) (0.17) (0.35) (0.66) (0.16) 
lninc 0.055 0.018 0.037 0.054 0.019 0.036 
 (1.35) (0.48) (0.96) (1.35) (0.50) (0.95) 
incarc -0.013 0.172 0.091 -0.011 0.163 0.100 
 (0.06) (0.83) (0.43) (0.05) (0.78) (0.48) 
intob -0.001 0.015 0.012 -0.001 0.016 0.012 
 (0.06) (1.21) (0.96) (0.06) (1.24) (0.92) 
nowmarried 1.189 0.341 0.237 1.187 0.318 0.252 
 (2.79)** (0.81) (0.55) (2.78)** (0.76) (0.59) 
evermarried 0.257 0.009 0.121 0.257 0.016 0.116 
 (1.11) (0.04) (0.55) (1.11) (0.07) (0.53) 
child -0.146 -0.059 -0.056 -0.145 -0.059 -0.055 
 (2.68)** (1.37) (1.24) (2.67)** (1.36) (1.23) 
 5
childwithu 0.623 0.258 0.177 0.623 0.261 0.173 
 (4.23)** (1.74) (1.17) (4.23)** (1.76) (1.15) 
Constant 0.102 1.215 3.097 0.085 1.756 2.764 
 (0.06) (0.83) (2.08)* (0.06) (1.27) (1.96)* 
Observations 2612 2612 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
The table reports Multinomial (polytomous) logistic regression results. The coefficients should be 
interpreted as the effect of a variable on one housing arrangement (PDS, other-bad or all else) relative 
to the reference group, DLA. 
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Appendix 3: First-Stage of IV Regression 
12-Months Living Arrangement 
Multinomial Logit Regression with Short Set of Controls 
 Omitted Group = DLA (Definitely Living Along)  
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2  
 PDS Other-bad All else PDS Other-bad All else 
Treatment Site Dummies 0.230 -0.123 -0.146 na na na 
 (2.57)** (1.45) (1.70)    
3-month psychosis 0.001 0.026 0.017 0.001 0.026 0.017 
 (0.21) (5.27)** (3.35)** (0.21) (5.25)** (3.32)** 
voucher 0.156 -0.515 -1.364 0.040 -0.484 -1.329 
 (1.09) (3.78)** (9.54)** (0.30) (3.66)** (9.55)** 
f1993 -0.361 -0.503 -0.059 -0.329 -0.519 -0.086 
 (3.71)** (4.99)** (0.55) (3.41)** (5.21)** (0.81) 
f1994 0.132 0.495 0.158 0.110 0.507 0.172 
 (1.07) (3.97)** (1.22) (0.89) (4.08)** (1.34) 
f1995 0.040 0.435 0.415 0.043 0.439 0.428 
 (0.64) (6.05)** (6.11)** (0.69) (6.09)** (6.30)** 
pds_3m 2.714 1.952 0.982 2.718 1.947 0.979 
 (14.10)** (8.46)** (4.64)** (14.13)** (8.44)** (4.63)** 
other_3m 1.048 1.142 1.044 1.043 1.145 1.051 
 (6.36) (5.96)** (6.85)** (6.34)** (5.98)** (6.89)** 
badother_3m 1.042 2.220 0.947 1.057 2.213 0.942 
 (6.33)** (11.97)** (6.20)** (6.43)** (11.93)** (6.17)** 
male -0.558 0.431 0.037 -0.560 0.431 0.038 
 (6.48)** (4.88)** (0.43) (6.50) (4.87)** (0.44) 
black 0.176 0.229 0.114 0.178 0.230 0.111 
 (1.97)* (2.65)** (1.30) (1.99)* (2.65)** (1.26) 
hispanic 0.237 0.115 0.055 0.229 0.120 0.058 
 (1.08) (0.55) (0.26) (1.05) (0.57) (0.27) 
age -0.039 -0.015 -0.008 -0.039 -0.015 -0.008 
 (8.41)** (3.47)** (1.86) (8.48)** (3.43)** (1.79) 
Constant 0.382 -0.804 2.860 0.902 -0.987 2.648 
 (0.66) (1.44) (5.10)** (1.67) (1.84) (4.92)** 
Observations 5325 5325 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
The table reports Multinomial (polytomous) logistic regression results. The coefficients should be 
interpreted as the effect of a variable on one housing arrangement (PDS, other-bad or all else) relative 
to the reference group, DLA. 
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Appendix 4: First-Stage of IV Regression 
12-Months Living Arrangement 
Multinomial Logit Regression with Long Set of Controls 
Omitted Group = DLA (Definitely Living Along)  
 
 Regression 1 Regression 2  
 PDS Other-bad All else PDS Other-bad All else 
Treatment Site Dummies 0.389 0.140 0.100 na na na 
 (2.92)** (1.01) (0.69)    
3-month psychosis -0.012 0.027 0.010 -0.012 0.027 0.010 
 (1.47) (3.42)** (1.20) (1.48) (3.43)** (1.20) 
voucher 0.220 -0.463 -1.212 0.005 -0.558 -1.299 
 (1.02) (2.10)* (5.02)** (0.02) (2.62)** (5.53)** 
f1993 -0.435 -0.697 -0.094 -0.374 -0.665 -0.074 
 (2.99)** (4.36)** (0.53) (2.63)** (4.24)** (0.43) 
f1994 0.292 0.819 0.330 0.248 0.794 0.315 
 (1.57) (3.95)** (1.52) (1.34) (3.86)** (1.46) 
f1995 0.063 0.426 0.393 0.074 0.432 0.404 
 (0.70) (4.11)** (3.69)** (0.82) (4.15)** (3.78)** 
male -0.464 0.322 0.014 -0.463 0.321 0.013 
 (3.19)** (2.11)* (0.09) (3.19)** (2.11)* (0.08) 
black 0.248 0.236 0.199 0.257 0.240 0.201 
 (1.79) (1.61) (1.28) (1.86) (1.64) (1.30) 
hispanic 0.354 0.600 0.385 0.336 0.593 0.383 
 (1.00) (1.69) (1.00) (0.95) (1.66) (0.99) 
age -0.048 -0.023 -0.026 -0.048 -0.024 -0.026 
 (4.92)** (2.32)* (2.46)* (4.98)** (2.32)* (2.45)** 
english 0.288 0.346 0.300 0.243 0.331 0.293 
 (0.98) (1.15) (0.93) (0.83) (1.10) (0.91) 
yearcity -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002 
 (0.24) (0.67) (0.30) (0.02) (0.75) (0.34) 
veteran -0.100 0.145 -0.266 -0.082 0.154 -0.261 
 (0.55) (0.82) (1.35) (0.46) (0.87) (1.32) 
payee -0.110 -0.025 0.171 -0.137 -0.035 0.166 
 (0.54) (0.12) (0.81) (0.67) (0.17) (0.78) 
edu 0.028 -0.019 0.019 0.026 -0.020 0.019 
 (0.99) (0.66) (0.63) (0.90) (0.70) (0.62) 
finstab 0.008 0.001 -0.017 0.010 0.002 -0.016 
 (0.29) (0.03) (0.54) (0.37) (0.06) (0.51) 
sociop -0.014 -0.016 -0.010 -0.014 -0.016 -0.010 
 (0.45) (0.51) (0.28) (0.44) (0.51) (0.29) 
lninc 0.012 -0.029 -0.038 0.011 -0.030 -0.039 
 (0.45) (1.01) (1.26) (0.42) (1.03) (1.29) 
incarc 0.031 0.369 0.253 0.022 0.367 0.251 
 (0.21) (2.31)* (1.55) (0.15) (2.30)* (1.53) 
intob -0.016 0.008 0.001 -0.015 0.008 0.001 
 (1.80) (0.93) (0.09) (1.77) (0.96) (0.07) 
nowmarried 0.748 0.127 0.562 0.729 0.120 0.557 
 (2.52)* (0.40) (1.73) (2.46)* (0.38) (1.72) 
evermarried -0.102 -0.307 -0.020 -0.082 -0.299 -0.015 
 (0.68) (1.98)* (0.12) (0.56) (1.94) (0.09) 
child -0.016 0.041 0.033 -0.017 0.041 0.033 
 (0.40) (1.02) (0.77) (0.43) (1.03) (0.79) 
 5
childwithu 0.733 0.255 0.144 0.730 0.253 0.141 
 (6.30)** (1.88) (1.00) (6.29)** (1.87) (0.98) 
Constant 1.113 0.424 2.990 2.101 0.823 3.322 
 (1.12) (0.41) (2.76)** (2.24)* (0.84) (3.18)* 
Observations 2425 2425 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
The table reports Multinomial (polytomous) logistic regression results. The coefficients should be 
interpreted as the effect of a variable on one housing arrangement (PDS, other-bad or all else) relative 
to the reference group, DLA. 
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